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CORRESPONDENCE
Three Mistakes About Interpretation
Paul Campos*

The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is
"interpretation." The single most confusing word in modem constitutional theory is "interpretation." What accounts for this unhappy
state of affairs?
The following passage appears in Barry Friedman's recent contribution to the unending debate concerning the legitimacy of judicial
review:
The Constitution has evolved far more outside Article V than within it.
Interpretations of constitutional clauses have undergone sea changes
from generation to generation, far outstripping the consequence of many
explicitly worded amendments. Obvious examples abound: the Commerce Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause, and so on. One seriously wonders if the Constitution
would have endured absent language spacious enough to accommodate
such change.
Because the Constitution is spacious, no single offered interpretation
of the text is likely to be accepted as correct now and for all time. . . . As
disagreement occurs, the document will take on new meanings.
Nor is the lack of finality necessarily a bad thing. . . . In reality, the
process of constitutional interpretation is dynamic, not static. . . . Moreover, such dynamism is critical to the success of the venture. Judges too
are human, and judges get things wrong....
Finality would curtail the evolution of our Constitution; dynamism
encourages it. Constitutional meaning changes because people disagree
about what the text means. Dynamism is to be encouraged, for the dynamic process helps formulate the interpretation of our fundamental
charter. 1

This passage makes certain assertions that have achieved the status
of axioms among many contemporary constitutional law scholars and
that are central to Friedman's defense of judicial review. Three of
these assertions are particularly important in regard to questions of
constitutional interpretation: (1) the meaning of the constitutional
text has changed and continues to change; (2) disagreements about the
meaning of the text cause these changes; and (3) these disagreements
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B. 1982, M.A. 1983, J.D.
1989, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 651-52 (1993).
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are desirable because judges sometimes make interpretive errors, and
disagreement creates the opportunity to replace erroneous interpretations with correct ones.
I will try to show that these assertions, as well as others that are
but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense
truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are
instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately incoherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language. 2

I. AsSERTION NUMBER ONE: THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT HAS CHANGED AND CONTINUES
To CHANGE.
What truth conditions must hold in order to give this claim a measure of plausibility? First, the interpreter of the text must dispense
with any notion that the intentions of its author(s) determine the
meaning of a text. The assertion that a text means what its author
intends it to mean leads to the conclusion that the text's meaning cannot change unless and until the text has a new author. Yet if the text
acquires a new author, and the interpreter holds the text to mean what
its new author intends it to mean, then it is simply arbitrary to claim
that one is dealing with one and the same text. 3
I can clarify this point with an example. Suppose my wife leaves a
note in our mailbox reading "Meet me at the usual place at noon," and
that my colleague Bob's friend Jane leaves a verbally identical note in
his mailbox. No one would suppose that my wife's note means the
same thing as Jane's verbally identical message. It would be just as
peculiar to suppose that the meaning of my wife's text had changed
when it was employed by Jane. Obviously, Jane has used the same
linguistic signs to signify a different message, and therefore she has,
according to an intentionalist account of textual interpretation, necessarily created a different text.
It follows that the meaning of the constitutional text can change
only if something other than the authors' intentions generates that
2. For an account of what textual interpretation must always in fact consist, see Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279 (1992) [hereinafter, Campos,
Against Constitutional Theory]; Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and
the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1993) [hereinafter Campos, That Obscure
Object of Desire].
3. Supplying old texts with new authors is becoming a common methodological recommendation in contemporary legal theory. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988) (statutes should be interpreted in a present-minded fashion,
as if they had been enacted recently); Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth
Amendment? An Essay in Redemptive History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 1993) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should be read as if the slaves themselves had written it).
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meaning. Therefore, even if the interpreter is willing to jettison the
original authors and replace them with someone else, the new author(s) would, from an intentionalist perspective, generate a new text,
even if that text should remain verbally identical with the text it
replaces.
Another important consequence that flows from the claim that the
constitutional text's meaning changes is that the interpreter cannot
claim that textual meaning is determined by some realist ontology that
equates textual meaning with the text's supposed capacity to reflect
ultimate moral truths. In other words, the true knowledge held by (fill in god-term with appropriate signifier)4 - concerning the ultimate
morality of abortion, or capital punishment, or flag desecration laws
would be irrelevant to the question of how the constitutional text's
meaning changes in regard to these or any other issues. For unless
God or the Equivalent changes His mind as to what constitutes moral
truth, it would make no sense, according to a moral realist account of
interpretation, to claim that the meaning of the constitutional text ever
changes in regard to the moral issues with which that text deals.
Of course, neither of these truth conditions will prove in any sense
troubling to the typical progressive constitutional law theorist. It is by
now second nature for such persons to deride the absurd notion that
the Constitution's text means what its authors intended it to mean. 5
And we can be fairly certain that even fewer bien pensants are willing
to join such natural law theorists as Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd in
the Platonic affirmation that nature is but a spume that plays upon a
ghostly paradigm of things. 6
But this response only leaves the fundamental question unanswered. If neither the author's intent nor the actual content of moral
reality provides us with the appropriate interpretive referents, what
does determine the meaning of the constitutional text? Here our second axiom comes into play.

4. On filling the "god-term," see KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 110 (1969).
5. "The framers' opinions [as to the text's meaning] .•. are both unknowable and, as they
themselves thought, irrelevant." Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Remlution and the Supreme
Court, N.Y. REV. BooKs, July 18, 1990, at 23. Consider this apt rejoinder: "The claim as
summarized is sufficiently remarkable, for if the framers' opinions are unknowable, how do we
know they considered them irrelevant; and if their opinions are irrelevant, why should we care
what they thought about their opinions?" Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive
Controversy, in PRAGMATISM JN LAW AND SOCIETY 323, 340 (Michael Brint & William Weaver
eds., 1991).
6. See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990); Michael S. Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, SB S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).
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II.

AsSERTION NUMBER Two: THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT CHANGES BECAUSE PEOPLE
DISAGREE ABOUT WHAT THE TEXT MEANS

This claim is, on its face, nothing less than bizarre. How does it
differ from the claim that "the height of Mount Everest changes because people disagree about its height?" Unless one subscribes to
something along the lines of an extreme Berkeleian idealism, 7 or to the
crudest sort of pragmatism - that is, the notion that the truth of a
matter is by definition identical with beliefs about the truth of a matter
- it is hard to understand how anyone could even entertain such a
view. Clearly some alternative characterization of the claim is
necessary.
How must "the meaning of the text" differ from "the height of
Mount Everest" so as to make our second axiom less absurd? The
height of Mount Everest is an empirically verifiable fact, of a kind
which necessarily remains external to the observer. 8 Disagreement
concerning that fact does not alter its status as such. It would seem,
then, that "the meaning of the text" would have to be a different kind
of fact, if we are to make our second axiom intelligible.
Suppose we were to agree that what we meant by "the height of
Mount Everest" was "the opinion of A concerning the height of
Mount Everest," when A is anyone who is duly authorized to have an
opinion on the subject. Suppose further that at time Tl, X and only X
is authorized to have an opinion concerning the question, while at time
T2, Y and only Y is so authorized. 9 If X and Y disagree about the
mountain's height, then under these conditions it would make sense to
say that, in this special sense, Mount Everest's height differed at T2
from what it was at Tl.
We can now intelligibly recharacterize the claim about the meaning of the constitutional text. If the text means what the interpreter
thinks it means, then interpretive disagreement would, by definition,
cause changes in textual meaning. If I interpret the phrase "cruel and
unusual punishments" to include capital punishment, then it does. If
you interpret those words to allow executions, then they do. The
7. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE (Colin M. Turbayne ed., 1970) (Dublin 1710).
8. By contrast, the observer's belief about the height of Mount Everest is a psychological fact
and therefore internal to the observer - although it too, of course, remains subject to empirical
verification.
9. If n number of persons are simultaneously authorized to have such an opinion, then at any
given time Mount Everest may exhibit n number of heights. Analogies to certain questions of
constitutional interpretation will no doubt suggest themselves to more skeptically inclined
readers.
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meaning of a text can change because people disagree about its meaning if and only if we assume that the different beliefs about the text's
meaning which constitute this disagreement also constitute that
meaning.
Indeed, several contemporary constitutional theorists have advocated this account of interpretation. From this "reader response" perspective, the meaning of the constitutional text is equivalent to some
interpretive community's beliefs about the text's meaning. 10 But
whether or not a theorist holds this position explicitly is less important
than the fact that anyone who subscribes to the view that the meaning
of the constitutional text changes must either accept some version of it
or be placed in the untenable position of the theorist who holds that
the actual height of Mount Everest alters in response to the plurality
of beliefs that exist on that particular question.
The "reader response" version of the second axiom thus both saves
it from absurdity and renders the first axiom intelligible. It has, however, disastrous consequences for the third axiom.
III. AsSERTION NUMBER THREE: INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENT
Is OFTEN DESIRABLE BECAUSE JUDGES MAKE INTERPRETIVE
MISTAKES, AND DISAGREEMENT HELPS DISTINGUISH ERRONEOUS
INTERPRETATIONS FROM CORRECT ONES

"Interpretive disagreement" has recently undergone intellectual
gentrification and been transformed into the valorized concept of "dialogue." 11 The idea is that disagreement about what the Constitution
means creates a dialogic dynamic which allows the text to "evolve" as
a "living Constitution," and that this process of evolution thereby
helps eliminate erroneous interpretations.
This vision of interpretive conflict - which improbably combines
animism, social Darwinism, and a dash of Hegel via the hermeneutics
of Gadamer 12 - is perhaps the most crucial element in the belief systems of progressive constitutional theorists. Surely, these progressive
10. See, e.g., Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
1993).
The interpretation thesis, properly understood, frees us of the illusion not so much that a
text has only one meaning, but rather that it is the text itself, rather than the community of
readers, that determines its meaning. The point of the interpretation thesis, then, is [that]
... the meaning of a text may be fully determined, but if so, it is determined by institutional,
professional, or cultural attributes of the community of its interpreters, rather than by the
text itself.

Id.
11. Good examples are provided by ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT
(1992), and Friedman, supra note 1, at 655-80.
12. I describe the unfortunate influence of Gadamer's work on American legal theory in
Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire, supra note 2, at 1068-73.
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thinkers argue, the Constitution must "grow" through an evolutionary
process of "interpretation." If it did not, what hope would remain for
achieving the one sacred goal of all secular politics - progress? 13 The
dynamic process which helps formulate the interpretation of our fundamental charter works properly, then, when mistaken textual interpretations give way to correct - or, at least, less mistaken interpretations, thereby helping transform the meaning of the constitutional text into the best it can be. 14
It is difficult to convey adequately the fundamental incoherence of
this account. We have seen that, if interpreters hold the constitutional
text's meaning to change, this change can only take place on the assumption that the interpreters' beliefs determine what the text's meaning actually is. But if what the interpreter thinks the text means
determines the meaning of a text, it then involves the purest sort of
logical contradiction to imagine that an interpreter could produce a
mistaken interpretation.
How could it ever be possible, on this account, for a judge (or anyone else) to "get things wrong?" 15 Note that the reader-response account of interpretation does not preclude some interpretations from
being more desirable than others; it merely eliminates the possibility of
criticizing any interpretation on the grounds that it is an incorrect
interpretation.
For example, suppose I like cheeseburgers. Although you can, of
course, deplore this preference - cheeseburgers destroy the rain forests, cause heart disease, and so forth - it would be very strange for
you to do so on the grounds that I did not actually like cheeseburgers.
Yet, such a claim is precisely analogous to the position of constitutional law scholars who proclaim at one and the same time that the
meaning of the constitutional text changes, that this change is produced through interpretation, and that it is still possible to produce a
mistaken interpretation of the constitutional text.
But the reader-response approach to interpretation is even more
confused than this objection implies: for if a text means what its
reader thinks the text means, it becomes impossible to give an even
minimally coherent description of what interpretation actually involves. Recall the example of Mount Everest's height. Suppose we
recharacterize "the height of Mount Everest" as meaning "how high X
13. A perfect example of this mentality is President Clinton's statement about Ruth Bader
Ginsburg: "[Clinton] said he expected [Ginsburg] to move the court neither to the 'right' nor the
'left,' but 'forward.' " Joan Biskupic, Senate, 96-3, Approves Ginsburg as 107th Supreme Court
Justice, WASH. Posr, Aug. 4, 1993, at A4.
14. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986).
15. Friedman, supra note 1, at 652.
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thinks Mount Everest is." I ask X to reveal the height of Mount Everest. X responds that he does not have this information. I then ask X
to interpret the relevant evidence in order to acquire the information
he lacks, so that he can enlighten me as to the truth of the matter. X
replies that he has no idea what to do next. I proceed to reassure X
that his ignorance presents no problem because whatever belief he has
on the subject is, by definition, the correct answer to my question.
Note the paradoxical situation that Xis now in. What fact is he supposed to discover in order to form the belief that will provide the answer to his interpretive conundrum? By hypothesis, the only fact that
counts is a fact that does not, and indeed cannot, exist. For if X already
has a belief as to the height of Mount Everest, then he is no longer in
the position of an interpreter: that is, there is nothing for him to interpret in order to acquire the necessary belief, because he already has
that belief. On the other hand, if he really needs to interpret, if he
really must acquire a belief about this particular fact - that fact being
"how high X thinks Mount Everest is" - then there is quite literally
nothing for him to do because the particular fact he must discover in
order to acquire the appropriate belief concerning the height of Mount
Everest can only be acquired if he has already acquired it.
Now defenders of reader-response theory will surely claim that this
account is nothing but a caricature of their actual views. Such readers
will insist that textual meaning is generated not by an interpretive
community's discovery of its beliefs about the meaning of a text, but
rather through the community's acquisition of beliefs about what it
takes to be the actual meaning of the text - a meaning which the
interpretive community, if it is to undertake interpretation at all, must
believe is independent of its beliefs about that meaning.
But this response is simply evasive. The fundamental question remains: what fact is the interpretive community attempting to discover? To answer "the meaning of the text" merely begs the question.
Yet if the reader-response theorist does point to some adequately specified fact, rather than to the interpretive community's beliefs about
that fact, then the question becomes, why is that fact itself not the
correct answer to the community's interpretive question?
The reader-response account of interpretation thus generates both
logical and psychological absurdities: such an account requires interpreters either to have already interpreted the text in order to interpret
it or to adopt an arbitrary and irrational preference in favor of
whatever interpretive mistakes they happen to make. If one rejects
reader-response theory, however, the assumption that the meaning of
a text can change through its interpretation results in the obvious em-
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pirical absurdity of such statements as "the height of Mount Everest
changes because people disagree about its height." 16
How did so much recent constitutional theory come to adopt such
a profoundly confused set of assumptions concerning the identity and
interpretation of texts? In my view, three interrelated factors have
been of paramount importance: an apparently unshakable allegiance
to linguistic formalism, a wholesale failure to clarify what "interpretation" means, and a willingness to pursue largely illusionary instrumental goals to the detriment of more intellectual projects.
The axiomatic status for a constitutional theory of formalist assumptions about language is best illustrated by the almost universal
desire to separate something called "the constitutional text" from any
agent's intentions or beliefs concerning that linguistic artifact. No
matter what else constitutional theorists believe - whether they advocate "strict" or "moderate" originalism, or "progressive interpretation," or even an explicit reader-response theory - they are almost
unanimous in their agreement that the autonomous language of the
constitutional text precludes certain results.17 Hence, a twenty-seven
year-old cannot be elected President not because the Framers intended
otherwise, or because such a result is per se undesirable, but simply
because the relevant piece of constitutional text is insufficiently "spacious" to allow for this result. As I have argued elsewhere, 18 such
beliefs mistakenly assume that it is some quality inherent in "the text
itself," rather than in our interpretive assumptions about the intentions
of the text's authors, which determines whether or not we believe a
particular provision's meaning is "narrow" or "spacious" and therefore is or is not amenable to "interpretation."
An unfortunate consequence of this mistake is constitutional the16. A version of the claim that the meaning of a text changes through its interpretation,
which avoids the pitfalls of reader response-theory, goes as follows: "The meaning of a legal text
does not change per se, yet the functional meaning of a legal text must be understood to be what
an authoritative interpreter says about that meaning. Hence a legal text's functional meaning
may change, although its true meaning does not." This is indeed a plausible account of constitutional interpretation. The problem for progressive constitutional theorists remains that they have
no plausible account of the ontology of the textual entity containing the "true meaning" that
would enable such functional (mis)interpretation.
17. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987).
Arguments from text play a universally accepted role in constitutional debate. . . .
Where the text speaks clearly and unambiguously - for example, when it says the President
must be at least thirty-five years old - its plain meaning is dispositive. Where the text is
ambiguous or vague, other sources are consulted as guides to textual meaning.
Id. Fallon's inclusion of the "framers' intent" as one of those "other sources" underscores the
axiomatic status of textual autonomy for constitutional theorists.
18. See generally Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 2; Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire, supra note 2.
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ory's failure to recognize the essential inadequacy of a definition of
"the text" which limits its identity to a particular set of marks. If a
text is identical with the marks that encode it, then "interpretation"
will come to mean whatever we can plausibly do with or to those same
marks. Such a definition is extremely problematic for many reasons,
not the least of which being that, as modem literary theory has
demonstrated, the answer to the question of what we can plausibly do
with or to a particular set of marks is: (almost) anything. 19
Thus the formalist assumption that at least part - and often all of the meaning of a text is determined through the application of the
rules of language to a particular set of marks leads directly to constitutional theory's failure to specify adequately what is meant by "interpretation." Because the rules of language are by themselves such
obviously inadequate tools for determining textual meaning, "interpretation" has come to signify whatever can be done to "texts" (marks)
when the rules of language run out. And because this spacious category includes such things as determining what the author intended; 20
failing to determine what the author intended;21 attempting to determine what the author(s) would have intended if he, she, or they knew
what we know, or believed what we believe; 22 confusing the author
with the reader; 23 ignoring the author to the extent necessary to undertake textual "rehabilitation"; 24 misreading the author so as to make
his text the best it can be, 25 or, conversely, the worst it can be; 26 as well
as many variations on these and other "interpretive methods," it is
hardly surprising that so little has been gained in the course of constitutional theory's obsessive and interminable analysis of all these phenomena under the single rubric of "interpretation. " 27
19. A classic literary-critical demonstration of the protean malleability of linguistic signs is
provided in STANLEY FISH, How To Recognize a Poem When You See One, in Is THERE A TEXT
IN THIS CLASS? 322 (1980).
20. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
21. Id.
22. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
23. See West, supra note 10.
24. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
25. See DWORKIN, supra note 14.
26. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
27. See Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1993).
Dare I suggest that we stop talking about judicial review and theories of interpretation?
This symposium celebrates one hundred years of scholarship on judicial review and the
manner in which it ought to be exercised, and we are no further than [when] we started.
The debates are still as unresolved, and as rancorous, as they have ever been.
Id.
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To return to the question with which we began: how do we account for this unfortunate state of affairs? Among legal academics,
whenever I have argued for the view that, as a descriptive matter, the
meaning of a text is always what its authors intended it to mean and
that claims that the constitutional text's meaning can change are based
on a fundamental misunderstanding, someone will invariably ask, "but
what about Brown v. Board of Education?" Now on one level this is a
pretty strange question. The implication that, in 1993, any legal academic's views on textual interpretation could have any relevance to, let
alone an effect on, the social issues dealt with in Brown is one that
strikes this legal academic as fairly preposterous. 28
But on another level the question makes perfect sense. The selfimages of contemporary legal academics, and especially those of constitutional theorists, are, with very few exceptions, relentlessly normative.29 If you imagine that your job is - or if your sense of self
consists of - being a person who tells the Supreme Court exactly
what our fundamental law requires, any lines of inquiry which might
suggest that the social practice called "constitutional interpretation" is
a deeply confused and essentially incoherent enterprise will tend to be
dismissed out of hand. Legitimation anxiety takes over, and something akin to the following syllogism represses the impulse toward
critical thought:
(1) - - (the theorist's sacred cow) was correctly decided.
(2) The "original meaning" of the relevant constitutional provision is
at odds with this result, therefore
(3) the meaning of that provision has grown or evolved or been altered
dynamically through ... "interpretation."

Perhaps if constitutional theorists opened themselves up to the
therapeutic insight that neither the Supreme Court nor any other
player on the fields of state action is paying much attention to their
Herculean exertions in the service of "the justice-seeking Constitution,"30 they could develop more of an interest in certain radically underinvestigated questions. To name only one: if a social practice is
deeply confused and fundamentally incoherent, does that necessarily
imply that there is something wrong with it?

28. For a careful argument that the Brown decision itself had relatively little influence on the
social problems it addressed, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
29. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
30. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).

